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Occupational health and safety legislation: 
what else is needed? 
Ian Campbell* 
If regulation is to be effective, not only must changes take place in the mode of 
regulation but also the concepts held by many in management ranks. 
Misconceptions often abound which, it is suggested, stem from a lack of 
appreciation of accident causation, the part that the management system plays or a 
tendency to blame the vict.im. Thus, too m .uch attention continues to be paid to 
operator error, whereas ,in reality, it is frequently the organization that has failed. 
However, when management recognizes t.he pivotal role of the system, and makes 
greater use of quality control methods, the way will be open for the inspectorate also 
to be mo~e ,innovative. They will the.n be initially auditors of the management of ,the 
occupational health and safety policy. Without that change the enforcers will, of 
necessity, continue to be searchers for violations .and investigators after the event. 
It is also likely that the health hazards of the .working environment will continue to 
be given inadequat,e attention. With the introduction of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Bill into Parliament in 1990, followed by a change of government bringing its 
new agenda and th,us casting an ominous shadow of concern, such factors assume 
a greater degree of importance. 
1. Introduction 
Though the conclusions of many studies that have attempted to measure the 
effectiveness of occupational health and safety legislation hav~e been a little disappointing 
to say the l~east, over time, much has been accomplished. As we have learned how to 
cope with many of the more obvious hazards, mainly of a broadly physical or mechanical 
nature, modem technology has brought many new challenges in its wake. For example, 
who would have envisaged 30 or more years ago, that we would now be concerned with 
health problems in the ordinary office; previously thought to be, and which mostly was, 
the most benign of ~environments. Again, until relatively recently the emphasis has 
almost exclusively been on safety factors and, though much is now changing, one must 
question whether the r·ecognition of the health hazards of 'the working environment is 
proceeding fast enough. 
In addition to considering developments in other countries and the indications ~or 
change set out in the more recent conventions of the International Labour Organization, it 
is also logical to ~examine some of the reasons why so many negative attitudes still 
abound. Why, for example, is there not more enthusiasm for a participative approach or 
a greater detetanination to deal mor~e effectively with the health hazards of the working 
~environment? Our very dilatory approach to the pfoblems of asbestos is glaring evidence 
of the chronic inertia that has plagued New Zealand for too many years. Many will see 
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some hope for improvement in the Occupational Safety and Health Bill but are there 
roadblocks ahead? Prior to the 1990 General Election National Party spokesman on 
industrial relations, Bill Birch, is reported as saying: "if the Bill does survive the election, 
National's changes will make it unrecognisable." (National Business Review, 28 August 
1990, p.4). If we are not to perpetuate the seeming indifference of past authorities to 
change, then both the need for change and the factors keeping past prejudice alive need to 
be discussed, better understood and adverse influences countered. That is the objective of 
this paper. 
2. Recent legislative changes elsewhere 
What then are the indications from the more recent developments overseas? 
Unfortunately, whereas we once led the world in many of our innovative approaches, 
except for accident compensation, that appears to be no longer the case? It is certainly so 
with respect to occupational health and safety legislation, for while other countries have 
taken up the challenge of new approaches, we have lagged behind. That being so, what 
have we been missing? Since the Robens Report (Safety and health at work, 1972) much 
emphasis has been placed on the need for self-regulation., even though that particular 
aspect of the report has drawn a lot of criticism. Certainly Robens, as with any other 
report, contains much that can be criticized but are .all those criticisms justified? Surely 
the points that one can criticize should not be allowed to obscure the indisputable facts 
that it emphasizes or well-reasoned arguments for change. 
There are decided limits to the range of regulation itself, and to its enforcement. 
Thus appropriately, the principal message from Robens is the need to impress the 
responsibility of and need for action by "those who create the risks and those who work 
with them" (Safety and health at work, 1972, p.7). That view then leads quite naturally 
to a call for a more participative approach, a call that has not met with universal 
approval, despite its sheer logic . One could well ask whether the words "self-regulation" 
lack appeal, are misunderstood and even counter-productive. Interestingly in Canada, Dr 
James Ham sitting as a Royal Commissioner examining the health and safety of workers 
in Ontario mines embraced the same principles but expressed himself a little differently 
using the words: "internal responsibility system" stating: 
The acceptable levels of risks at work and in life-style are being redefined by 
society. It is essential that this process be marked by a higher measure of 
openness than has hitherto characterized government and industrial policy. 
Openness, contributive participation by workers, and thorough accountability 
can re-establish the self-regulatory character of the internal responsibility-
system at the compan}' level as the key to the control of risks at work in a 
technologically complex future. The regulatory and auditing functions of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Authority should be designed to uep the 
inlernal system a1 company level alert and responsive and to deal blunt.ly with 
the true offender (Report of the Royal Commission, 1976, p.250)(emphasis 
added). 
It is strongly contended that the key lies in the last sentence but more of that later . 
Though concerned with mines, this report led to the passing of the Ontario Occupational 
Health and Safety Act 1978, a statute similar to the post-Robens British Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 and much other Canadian and Australian legislation. 
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It appears nevertheless that, u a 
delegates is regarded u the more _..._ 
rights. Such delegates are in a 
the flow of operations whereas 
only from time to time and, as a rule, 
How then are these committees and aa4 all a, 
perfoiining? Responses to such a questiea w d bat it is clear dlat, 
properly structured, adequately trained, supported. ad access to essential 
info1mation on the hazards with which they have to they can perform a most 
useful function. 
In one of a number of studies commissioaed for an Ontario Royal Commission, 
Gunderson and Swinton, when attempting to make an of the efficacy of joint 
committees, commented: 
First, it appears that joint committees will work better In oraanized than non-
unionized workplaces. Even if [Ontario Pederadon of Labom] training is 
available to nonunion workers, they are lacldq in a aeneraJ. support system to 
assist them in establishing a committee md providiJll reaources to deal with 
problems as they arise. This is particularly 1nJe with reaud to recognition of 
health hazards md responses to then1. The en1ployees may often be in marginal 
companies, where pressure on health and safety may be perceived as a 
threat to employment security. 
Secondly, the committee's input may be more problematic with regard to 
health issues than with safety issues. Infolnlation problema are severe, for it 
may be difficult for workers to acquire infCflmalion on cheauic•la or other toxic 
substances in their work environment, particularly if a trade IWile is used. 
Certainly the Ministry of Labour study on voluntat)' committees found that 
"health issues are conspicuous by their near absence, particularly in those 
industries with recognised health problems" (Gunderson and Swinton. 1981, 
p.8.21). 
After suggesting that, even accepting some of the shortcomings outlined, they 
comment that "the joint committee is, however, an improvement on the situation with 
no joint committees." And later: 
Where management is cooperative with the joint committee, the joint 
committee cm have a valuable input into control of he•Jth hazarda. This may 
take the fonn of designing education propuns, discuasina new safety rules and 
communicating them to w9rkers, or working with manaamnent on the phuing 
out of the hazard (Gunderson and Swinton, 1981, p.8.22). 
Unsatisfactory aspects of the past performance of such committees should not be 
allowed to stultify progress. When one's eye is fu1nly glued to the rear vision mi•Ior of 
past attitudes, experience and convictions, little will be seen of the road of propess which 
still lies ahead. Many managements are still very reluctant to see peater worker 
involvement in occupational health and safety or any participation by the workforce in 
trade union education. If prog~ess is to be made such views need to be countered. On the 
other hand, others would maintain that more trade union involvement in occupational 
health and safety is long overdue, though unions themselves are stepping up their own 
educational programmes. 
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5. Causation 
It is insufficiently recognized that accidental injury and work-related disease seldom 
occurs as the result of one factor alone, for most injuries arise as a result of several 
factors some of which may be completely unrelated. Then there could be differences in 
injury reporting, not forgetting that each does not have the same threshold of pain. Much 
of this misunderstanding stems from inadequate investigation of accidents and their 
causation. For too long attention has been focussed on unsafe acts and conditions and the 
hasty determination of a single cause. Often inquiry has concentrated on the obvious, 
ignoring the real underlying causation and, sometimes, emotional factors may play too 
large a part in a detennination. Thus with good reason have some writers expounded on 
the myth of the careless worker. Today, for example, among other developments, 
ergonomics is giving us a greater insight into causation. 
6. Victim blaming 
Under this heading, it is suggested, lies another of the reasons why more progress 
has not been made, especially in harnessing the management system and the participatory 
approach. Out in the community and in the workplace, there is still a lot of negativism 
about occupational health and safety which must be counter~ed and overcome if real 
progress is to be made. Many hold a conviction that numerous accident victims are the 
authors of their own misfortune. True, often a superficial examination of the 
circumstances surrounding an accident will suggest that to be the case but one needs to 
look deeper. The underlying cause of many accidents can only be deteinained by a 
thorough and objective investigation of all the circumstances. 
7. The accident proneness theory 
The accident proneness theory, which stems from studies made among munition 
workers during World War I, has been responsible for one of the most unprofitable 
debates in the safety field. What is worse, it has, on occasions, been used to the 
detriment of genuine preventive measures, often as an excuse for inactivity. One of the 
more detailed studies, that of Arbous and Kerrich (1951, p.363), comments that this 
concentration on personal attributes has resulted in " .... an attempt to shift the blame 
from the environment to the individual, calling people and not workplaces, accident 
prone". 
These aspects need to be examined and put in their proper perspective. Obviously all 
people do not have the same degree of perception, coordination and dexterity and thus 
even in a group of similar individuals, there will be differing degrees of performance. 
Furtheunore, one's ability to undertake a particular task is not constant and may vary in 
response to a host of factors including health, personal problems and stress in its many 
fo1rns, all of which may vary over time. 
Much misunderstanding has been caused by the widely differing concepts, that many 
have concerning accident proneness, a tenn that can be subject to numerous and diverse 
interpretations. Several factors enter into the argument and clearly the first to consider is 
causation. It cannot be assumed that an injured person may be ellen partially the author 
of his or her own misfortune. Even in cases where a person may be plainly guilty of 
some inattention or disregard of rules, one needs to look further. There may have been 
some external factors influencing events such as pressure to complete a task, tiredness 
brought on by long working hours or family problems. 
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In addition to the very comprehensive paper of Arbous and Kenich, the other major 
work undertaken in recent years is that by Shaw and Sichel. Their concluding chapter 
begins somewhat realistically: 
It would be very gratifying to be able to end this section of the book by giving 
clear-cut answers to the two basic questions: "Is accident proneness a myth or a 
reality? and "If it is a reality, how much does it matter in the accident situation 
as a whole?"(Shaw and Sichel, 1971, p.416). 
And finally: 
But something which I have also tried to do is to show how research on accident 
proneness has done rather more than uncover many of the reasons why 
individual people have accidents. It has shown that one of the potent reasons 
why accidents happen at all, is that they are encouraged rather than prevented 
by the prevalent attitude of the community to the whole accident problem -
especially in those countries where accident rates are still unnecessarily high 
(Shaw and Sichel, 1971, p.421 ). 
In like vein, Sass and Cook (1981, p.107) conclude another examination of the 
various studies that hav~e been undertaken against the background of the typical work 
situation: 
If all this is combined with a dangerous physical work environment or 
hazardous work processes, then accidents are bound to take place. 'Telling 
workers not to have accidents is simply not a preventive measure, as accident 
liability is inherent in the very nature of the work. Blaming the victims for 
accidents is also fruitless, since it does not provide impetus for the elimination 
of hazardous ·conditions. In this respect, the accident proneness thesis has not 
been a benign scientific error. Its introduction may have been accompanied by 
the best of intentions, but its unquestioning acceptance and widespread use have 
obscured the need for development of a holistic approach toward understanding 
and preventing industrial accidents in light of the dynamic interaction between 
the socio-technical work environment and workers. 
What appears to be overlooked by those who make much of the proneness theory, 
even accepting there will be some who are more likely to be injured than others, is their 
failure to determine to what practical use that knowledge can be put. Can those 
individuals be identified and restricted to activities where their unfortunate characteristics 
will no longer be a risk and, if so, upon whom will such decisions fall? In the end 
perhaps the most disastrous effect of the whole debate is the ~emphasis it has given to the 
tendency to blame the victim and not to seek the basic ·causation. 
8. The influence of economic cond.itions 
Another factor which we have to accept today is the effect of the downturn in the 
economy, when the whole scene can well change. As ~Glendon and Booth comment when 
examining more recent developments in Britain: 
Since about 1979, however, there has been a decline in such activity [trade 
union stimulus]. Incr~easing worker expectations regarding health and safety 
generated since the mid-l970s are now coming into conflict with the effects of 
the economic recession, which operate to reduce expenditure on health and 
safety and ~concomitantly increase redundancy fears and channel trade union 
activity more towards job preservation. Despite increasing worker concern 
about the work environment, trade unions have greater difficulty in pressing 
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health and safety demands in an 
limited backing for safety 
national level, and there ue some 
national campaigns by trade unions (G 
9. Supplementing regulation: q 
At this point it is interesting to recall the words of Helmich wllose tst, first 
published in 1931, is regarded as the beginning of the approach to occupational 
health and safety when he commented: 
The control of quality and quantity of produat 1114 ef the frequency and severity 
of accident occurrence have much in coiiiDIOIL IB milD)' ouu the same faul-, 
practice is involved, and the reason for ewii18Dee of the fault il aimilu:, both for 
accident occurrence and for unsatisfactory pmcluctioa 1941, p.40). 
In view of Heinrich's linking of accident frequency with quality 60 years ago. it in 
interesting to see that now that view is emergiag apia. 
Much more needs to be done to emphasize that compliance with regulatory 
provisions alone, will not ensure the safest or healthiest possible workplace. Regulation 
needs to be so designed and enforced that attention is first focussed on the management of 
the organization, its systems and quality controls. In a review of the health and safety 
legislation administered by the Maritime Division of the New Zealand Ministry of 
Transport much emphasis was laid on quality control. After refening to the work of Dr 
Edwards Deming (1982, p.352) in Japan, immediately following the World War u. where 
he stressed the importance of statistical methods and quality control the report goes on to 
stress the relationship between quality and safety commenting: 
Why have we been talking about quality when we are supposed to be conce~ned 
with safety? Because the two are inextricably intertWined, in fact safety is a 
subset of quality. We can show this axiomatically. Let us take DeminJ's 
definition of quality - a product or service supplied reliably according to 
specification - and let the required safety levels be put of the specification. 
Then it automatically follows that the product will be a safe product. This 
principle applies to the manufacture and maintenance of all products with which 
the Maritime Transport Division is involved, such u boilers, Ufts, cranea, 
pressure and refrigerant vessels, ships and boats •••• Puttina it another way; a 
quality product is a safe product, a quality maintenance system is a safe 
maintenance system (D'Souza et al., 1989, p.Sl). 
Under the heading "Cultural factors" the report continues: 
These quality-system principles are only if quality ia part of the culture 
of the whole fum, from top-management down. Preferably they should be 
accepted throughout the sector in which the finn operatea, and better adll they 
should be a feature of the national culture. At tho level of tho firm, for example. 
it would be futile to try to build a quality product in a slipshod factory. Up-
service and buzzwords will not produce quality and aafety .... Here aailn we 
stress that such values need to be reinforced by the total national environment· 
they should be evident in the behaviour of manaaera and the leadera of aoclot.J. 
Such changes cannot be produced overnight. Time and eft-' wiD be requimcl to 
bring them about (p.51). 
Though many may feel that such an approach is not for the average nndorta~DS 1bat 
is not so. Quality of product or service should be the aim of every uadertakina and 
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An institute 
The proposal for an institute to be the technical, scientific and research arm of the 
commission has faded into obscurity. The efforts of the Health Departtnent to establish 
adequate technical, scientific and research resources over the last 3 decades have only met 
with limited success despite the very detet1nined efforts on the part of a small number of 
very dedicated officials. Regrettably, the events of the recent past have seen a 
dismembering of most of what remained. The technical support needed by the 
inspectorate now comes from the Area Health Boards which do not all have the same 
ability to meet the needs. The recommendations of the Advisory Council for 
Occupational Health and Safety thus remain but a pipe dream. If the health hazards of the 
working environment are to be accorded adequate consideration, to say nothing of the 
safety aspects, then it is essential that the Advisory Council for Occupational Health and 
Safety recommendations be given the consideration that is their due. 
Unfortunately the rather pessimistic forebodings of Mullen (1990, p.141) appear to 
be warranted. 
11. A final comment 
Though the words "worker participation" have received considerable airing of recent 
years, one could well question whether that emphasis is justified. Should not a much 
wider view be taken, for clearly all sectors must participate and for that reason it is 
suggested that a "participatory approach" better describes what is needed. 
If regulation is to achieve its full potential, then it is suggested that there must be a 
considerable change in the approach of many, particularly those in the management team. 
In the long run, it is their systems that are on trial. If the considerable supportive role, 
that a participatory regime can play, is to be effective, then the negative factors such as 
victim-blaming, misapprehensions about causation and a sceptical if not an antagonistic 
view of the value of committees and workers' representatives need to be completely 
eliminated. One could well question whether the new government has been influenced by 
the less progressive elements of the employer ranks for their spokesman to indicate that 
they would "make unrecognisable," the far from revolutionary bill that was presented to 
Parliament in 1990. If those attitudes and influences are to remain unchanged and persist, 
then improvement in the occupational health and safety field so many have been seeking 
will remain but a dream. 
However with management recognising the pivotal role of the system, and with 
greater use of quality control methods, the way will be open for the inspectorate also to 
be more innovative. They will then be primarily auditors of the undertaking's 
management of the occupational health and safety policy, rather than mere searchers for 
non-compliance. Such an approach is always predicated to Dr Ham's edict that the true 
offender must be dealt with bluntly. Nevertheless, in the end, if regulation continues to 
be viewed as the main or even the ultimate protector of workers' lives, then we will have 
failed. 
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